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Entry and Exclusion of Refugees
The Obligations of States and
the Protection Function of the
Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill*
INTRODUCTION
Refugee problems today tend to have one factor in common-the huge
numbers of people involved. But whether it is a case of one or of a mass
of individuals, each arriving asylum seeker represents a challenge to estab-
lished principles of state sovereignty. International jurists once wrote of
the free movement of persons between nations, unhampered by passport
and visa control. Since the late nineteenth century, however, the principle
most widely accepted has been that each state retains exclusive control-
an absolute discretion-over the admission to its territory of foreign na-
tionals, refugees or not. 1 Although in practice many countries concede that
certain individuals may have some claim to enter (e.g., the close family
members of local citizens or lawful residents), such claims must rely for
their enforcement and implementation upon municipal law, and only rare-
ly does international law have any relevance. 2
The legal framework within which the refugee is located remains char-
acterized by, on the one hand, the principle of state sovereignty and related
principles of territorial supremacy, self-defense, and self-preservation; and
on the other hand, by competing humanitarian principles deriving from
general international law (including the purposes and principles of the
United Nations) and from treaty. This article examines the extent to which
the latter may confine and structure an otherwise apparently absolute
* M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.), of the Inner Temple, Barrister; Legal Adviser and Protection
Officer in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The views
expressed are the author's personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Office.
Copyright @ 1980 by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill.
292 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES
discretion over the entry of foreign nationals. In this context, attention is
paid to the status of international organizations and their role in develop-
ing and applying principles of international law, as well as to their impact
on the standing of the individual. The major focus is on the entry of
refugees and asylum seekers, although what is said in that regard is also
relevant to the related questions of expulsion of lawfully resident refugees
and extradition of refugees.
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
Functions of UNHCR
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) is the most recent in a line of international agencies concerned
with refugees, whose history stretches back to the first years of the League
of Nations. 3 Early in 1946, the United Nations General Assembly had
acknowledged that no refugee with "valid objections" should be com-
pelled to return to his or her country of origin. 4 This fundamental principle
was expressly included in the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization (IRO, 1947-52), adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1946. This body 5 assisted some 1,620,000 refugees during
its short life, but its overall purpose was specific and limited. Some more
"international" body was called for, which would be competent to deal
with emerging refugee problems and to extend the necessary "protection"
to refugees. In 1949, therefore, the UN General Assembly decided to estab-
lish the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 6
and at the following session, the Statute was formally accepted, annexed
to Resolution 428 of December 14, 1950.7
Resolution 428(V) calls upon governments to cooperate with the Office
of UNHCR in the performance of its functions which, in turn, are set out
in the Statute. The role of UNHCR is there declared to encompass "provid-
ing international protection" and "seeking permanent solutions" to the
problems of refugees by way of voluntary repatriation or assimilation in
new national communities. 8 At the same time, the Statute expressly pro-
vides that "the work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely
non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate,
as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees. 9
Of the two functions, the provision of international protection is usual-
ly considered of primary importance. Without protection (for example,
intervention by the Office to secure temporary refuge for refugees), there
can be no possibility of finding durable solutions in the form of voluntary
repatriation, integration in the country of first asylum, or resettlement in
a third country.
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In addition to defining refugees within the competence of the Office, the
UNHCR Statute prescribes the relationship of the High Commissioner
with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECO-
SOC), makes provision for organization and finance, and identifies ways
in which the High Commissioner is to provide for the protection of ref-
ugees. 10 These include (1) promoting the conclusion of international con-
ventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application and
proposing amendments thereto; (2) promoting through special agreements
with governments the execution of any measures calculated to improve the
situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection; and
(3) promoting the admission of refugees.
Notwithstanding the statutory injunction that the work of the Office
shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees, it is common
knowledge that a major part of UNHCR's protection work is concerned
with individual cases, as was that of its predecessor organizations. To this
author's knowledge, no state has objected to the High Commissioner tak-
ing up individual cases as such," although states may and do question
whether an individual is indeed a refugee. 12 There can be little practical
point in requiring the High Commissioner to abstain from involvement in
individual cases; 13 such a dimension is a natural corollary to the stated
function of supervising the application of international conventions. As
discussed below, such instruments provide a definition of refugees which
is essentially individualistic, and provide rights on behalf of refugees
which can only be understood in the sense of the particular. The acquies-
cence of states in the individual protection function of UNHCR, neverthe-
less, significantly ddlineates both the competence of the Office and the
status of the individual refugee in international law.
Generally, authority for the universal protection of refugees by
UNHCR is traceable to the originating General Assembly Resolution
428(V) expressly calling on governments to cooperate with the Office in
the exercise of its functions. Such authority has been strengthened by a
succession of General Assembly resolutions, the most recent of which, for
example, "urges governments to intensify their support for the humanitari-
an activities of the High Commissioner by, inter alia, (a) facilitating the
accomplishment of his tasks in the field of international protection, in
particular, by granting asylum to those seeking refuge and by scrupulously
observing the principle of nonrefoulement." 14
Specific authority for the involvement of UNHCR in the protection of
refugees has been accorded the Office by states parties to the 1951 Conven-
tion and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. '5 Article
35 of the Convention, for example, provides: "The contracting States un-
dertake to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees .. . in the exercise of its functions, and shall in
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particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions
of this Convention." 16 The day-to-day protection activities are necessarily
dictated by the needs of refugees, but a summary reading of both the
Statute of the Office and the 1951 Convention generally indicates the
protection functions involved.
There are both direct and indirect aspects to the protection function,
with the latter comprising the promotional activities of the Office already
mentioned. Direct protection activities, involving intervention on behalf of
specific individuals or groups, cover the following matters. The Office is
concerned with protection generally of the refugee's basic human rights,
including, for example, nondiscrimination, liberty, and security of the
person. It is concerned specifically with the following: (1) the prevention
of refoulement (i.e., the return of refugees to a country or territory in which
their life or liberty may be endangered); (2) the determination of refugee
status; (3) the grant of asylum; (4) the prevention of expulsion; (5) the issue
of identity and travel documents; (6) the facilitation of voluntary repatria-
tion; (7) the facilitation of family reunion; (8) the assurance of access to
educational institutions; (9) the assurance of the right to work and the
benefit of other economic and social rights; and (10) the facilitation of
naturalization.
Of these, the first four, together with the general function, are clearly
of prime importance, and the principle of nonrefoulement is the sine qua non of
the search for permanent solutions. The Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme has recently stressed the importance of proce-
dures for the formal determination of refugee status, and in 1977 it expressed the
hope that states would establish such procedures and give favourable
consideration to UNHCR's participation. The same year the committee
also expressed its concern regarding the difficulties which asylum seekers
face in finding even temporary refuge, and it appealed to governments to
follow or to continue to follow liberal practices in regard to refugees who
have come directly to their territory. 17
Beneficiaries of UNHCR Activities
The High Commissioner's functions are, at first glance, limited to refugees
"within the scope of the .. .Statute," and as defined in paragraph 6
thereof. 18 The Statute first brings within the competence of the Office
refugees so considered under various earlier treaties. 19 It next includes
refugees resulting from events occurring before January 1, 1951, who are
outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to avail themselves
of its protection "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion." Finally, the
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Statute provides that the High Commissioner's competence shall extend
to:
Any other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or, if he has no
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or
had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nation-
ality or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his
nationality, or if he has no nationality, to return to the country of his former
habitual residence. 20
This description is of universal application, containing neither temporal
nor geographical limitations, and it remains of critical importance in deter-
mining the basic class of persons entitled to the protection and assistance
of the Office. Nevertheless, the Statute suggests an inherent contradiction.
While it affirms that the work of the Office shall relate, as a rule, to groups
and categories of refugees, at the same time, it proposes a definition of the
refugee which is essentially individualistic, requiring a case-by-case ex-
amination of subjective and objective elements. This factor, together with
postwar developments leading to an escalation of the world's refugee
population, has necessitated the introduction of a degree of flexibility into
the High Commissioner's mandate. The result has been a noticeable broad-
ening of what may be termed refugees of concern to the international
community.
The UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have
played a major role in these developments, while more recently the Execu-
tive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme has exercised a
similarly formative influence. 21 It was in 1957 that the General Assembly
first authorized the High Commissioner to assist persons who might not
qualify under the statutory definitions. 22 The case in question involved
the large number of mainland Chinese in Hong Kong whose status as
"refugees" was complicated by the existence of two Chinas, each of which
might have been entitled to exercise protection. In the circumstances,
express authorization of assistance activities was an essentially pragmatic
solution. 23
The General Assembly authorized assistance to other specific groups in
the years that followed. 24 Concurrently, the General Assembly developed,
little by little, the notion of the High Commissioner's "good offices" as an
umbrella idea under which to bring refugees who did not come within the
competence, or "immediate competence," 25 of the United Nations.The
type of assistance which the High Commissioner might render was initially
limited, often to the transmission of financial contributions, but that re-
striction was soon dropped. 26 These developments enabled the High Com-
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missioner's Office to be flexible and pragmatic in regard to refugee prob-
lems emerging in Africa during the 1960's. There the very size of the crises
militated against individual assessment of refugee status, as did the ab-
sence of appropriate machinery. 27
Other factors have also been identified as influencing the pragmatic,
rather than the doctrinal approach to the new problems. These have in-
cluded the desire to avoid the imputation on the internal situation of newly
independent states which is carried by every determination that a well-
founded fear of persecution exists; and the feeling, not always manifested,
that while "political conditions" had compelled the flight of the entire
group in question, it might not be possible to establish a well-founded fear
of persecution on an individual case-by-case basis. The "group approach"
to defining refugees, which concentrates on persons who are effectively
without the protection of their own government, can thus avoid the limita-
tions of a strictly legal definition. 28
Most recently, the General Assembly has spoken of and unanimously
commended the High Commissioner's activities on behalf of "refugees and
displaced persons of concern to his Office." The reference to "displaced
persons" dates from 1975, when it was contemporaneous with UNHCR's
first involvement in the Indochinese peninsula. 29 If the term was intended
to cover groups, besides refugees, who have crossed international frontiers,
then at that time it may have been a misnomer. Until then, the term
"displaced persons" had traditionally been used to describe those dis-
placed within their own country, for example, by the effects of civil strife
or natural disasters. 30 However, there is little doubt that the effect of
General Assembly resolutions over the past years has been to endow the
phrase with new meaning, and to broaden the class of those whom the
High Commissioner is expected to protect and assist.31
In summary, refugees and displaced persons within the mandate of, or
of concern to, the High Commissioner include not only those who can, on
a case-by-case basis, be determined to have a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on certain grounds, but also those often large groups or categories
of persons who can be determined or presumed to be without, or unable
to avail themselves of, the protection of the government of their state of
origin. 32
Whether this description can be said to represent, for all purposes, the
meaning of the term "refugees" in international law is less clear. The class
of persons "without, or unable to avail themselves of, the protection of the
government of their state or origin" begs many questions. 33 However, the
principle of nonrefoulement, the foundation stone of international protection,
does apply to a broad class of asylum seekers. It would hardly be permissi-
ble for a state to seek to avoid its obligations, either by declining to make
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a formal determination of refugee status, or by ignoring the development
of the refugee concept in state and international organization practice.
THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES
Obligations Deriving from Treaty
Whereas the Statute of UNHCR prescribes the functions and competence
of the Office within the United Nations organization, the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees provide, between
states parties, for the meaning of the term "refugee" and for appropriate
standards of treatment. The link between the Statute and the treaties is in
the supervisory role of UNHCR, conferred in general terms by the for-
mer, 3 4 and expressly acknowledged by states parties to the latter. 35
Deilniion of Refugees under the
1951 Convenhon and the 1967 Protocol
The states which acceded to or ratified the 1951 Convention initially
agreed that the term "refugee" should apply, first, to any person consid-
ered a refugee under earlier international arrangements and second, to any
person who, broadly speaking, qualifies as a refugee within the mandate
of UNHCR. 36 Originally, the definition, like the first part of that in the
Statute, limited application of the Convention to the refugee who acquired
such status "as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951." More-
over, there was an optional geographical limitation under which states
might, on ratification, choose to limit their obligations to refugees resulting
from "events occurring in Europe" prior to the critical date. 37 Finally, the
substantive or ideological basis for the essential "well-founded fear of
persecution" differs slightly from that in UNHCR's Statute, in that it
includes the criterion "membership of a particular social group" 38 in addi-
tion to race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 39
The statutory definition was a model for that in the Convention, but
various amendments were accepted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries
which adopted the final draft. 40 The reference to "membership of a par-
ticular social group," however, may not make any great practical difference
in the respective areas of competence of UNHCR and states parties to the
Convention and Protocol. This notion can be seen as clarifying certain
elements in the more traditional grounds for persecution-race, religion or
political opinion. Examples of persecution on social group grounds 41 will
often prove, on closer examination, to have a political basis; for example,
the group is persecuted because the government considers it inherently
disloyal and, rightly or wrongly, attributes dissident opinions to members
of the group as a class. 42
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It was recognized in 1951 that, in view of its various limitations, the
definition would not cover every refugee. The Conference of Plenipotenti-
aries therefore recommended in the Final Act that states should apply the
Convention beyond its strictly contractual scope, to other refugees within
their territory. 43 Many states relied upon this recommendation in response
to refugee situations precipitated by events after January 1, 1951, until the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees expressly removed that
limitation. 44 The recommendation may still be invoked by those who seek
an extension of the Convention to groups or individuals who do not fully
satisfy the definitional requirements.
In essence, therefore, Convention refugees are identifiable by their
possession of four elemental characteristics: (1) they are outside their
country of origin; (2) they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of
the protection of that country; (3) such inability or unwillingness is at-
tributable to a well-founded fear of being persecuted; and (4) the persecu-
tion feared is based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion.
Rights of Refugees under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Article 3 of the Convention obliges states to apply its provisions to ref-
ugees "without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin;"
most of those provisions in turn call for certain standards of treatment to
be accorded to refugees. In principle, therefore, states ought to establish
procedures for applying the definition and for identifying and recognizing
refugees, without which bona fide and effective implementation of the Con-
vention would not be possible. 45 Indeed, the establishment of such proce-
dures remains one of the principal objectives of the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees which, under Article 35 of the Convention, is
recognized by contracting states as having the duty of supervising applica-
tion of its provisions. 46
A detailed analysis of the definition is beyond the scope of the present
article. It may be noted in passing that "persecution," though a prominent
feature, is not defined. While it would encompass threats to life and liber-
ty, so that execution, detention, and torture are readily included, persecu-
tion is also very much a question of degree and proportion, requiring
relation of the general notion to commonly accepted principles of human
rights.
Refugees are created by conditions-political in the broadest sense-
which render continued residence impossible or intolerable. Depending on
the circumstances, persecution may thus comprise less overt measures,
such as the imposition of serious economic disadvantage, denial of access
to employment, to the professions or to education, failure (voluntary of
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involuntary) on the part of state authorities to prevent or suppress mob
violence against, for example, ethnic or religious minorities, or other re-
strictions on the freedoms traditionally guaranteed in a democratic society,
such as speech, assembly and worship. Persecution need not actually occur.
It may have happened already, or it may simply be anticipated. The mark
of the Convention refugee is a "well-founded fear of being persecuted"-
that factor looks more to the future than to the past. "Well-founded" in
turn means that there must be sufficient facts to justify the conclusion that
the applicant for refugee status, if returned to his or her country of origin,
would face a serious possibility 47 of being subjected to persecution.
States parties have agreed not only on the definition of refugees summa-
rized above, but also on standards of treatment for refugees either "lawful-
ly staying" in their territories, or present there illegally. The provisions of
the Convention cover a wide range of subjects: the rights of association,
access to the courts, employment, self-employment, rationing, housing,
education, public relief, social security, and freedom of movement. In
practice, questions of the application of these provisions arise only rarely
in many countries, as the rights in question tend to be guaranteed anyway
by lawful residence. Overall though, the aim in each case is to secure the
best possible treatment for refugees. The required standard varies between
national treatment and the minimum accorded to aliens generally.
Certain provisions, however, are quite exceptional and possess a very
special meaning for refugees. Thus, Article 28 obliges states to issue travel
documents to refugees lawfully staying in their territory (known as Con-
vention travel documents or CTDs). A Schedule to the Convention sets the
form for the document, prescribes various conditions for issue, provides
for "returnability" and for the recognition of CTDs issued by other states.
Article 31 of the Convention obliges states parties not to impose penalties
for illegal entry on refugees "coming directly from a territory where their
life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1," provided that
they report to the authorities without delay and show good cause for their
actions. Article 32 declares that a refugee lawfully within a state shall be
expelled only on grounds of national security or public order. A hearing
and appeal is to be permitted against such order of expulsion, except where
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require. Moreover, the
contracting states also agree to allow such refugees a reasonable period in
which to seek legal admission to another state, subject to the states' right
to apply such internal measures as they deem necessary. 48
Finally, Article 33, which is of general application and not limited to
refugees "lawfully staying" in the territory of a contracting state, declares
the fundamental principle of nonrefouleent-that no refugees shall be re-
turned in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where their
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life or freedom may be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 49
Refugee Status and Asylum
There is a glaring omission in the above, necessarily brief, statement of the
conventional rights of refugees: a refugee's or asylum seeker's right to be
admitted, temporarily or permanently, to a country, and his or her "right
to asylum." Neither the Convention nor the Protocol guarantees a right of
entry or imposes any duty to admit; indeed, these instruments are remark-
able for the extent to which asylum-in the sense of admission and protec-
tion-is ignored. The only references to asylum in the Convention are in
the Final Act and the Preamble. The former includes a recommendation
that governments "continue to receive refugees in their territories and that
they act in concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order
that.., refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement." 5
0
The Preamble to the Convention simply notes the unduly heavy burdens
which the grant of asylum may impose on certain countries and that a
solution to the problem demands international cooperation.
Article 31 provides only for certain instances of illegal entry, and antici-
pates either regularization of status, or admission into another country.
What the article does not do is to make any express provision for such
refugees' future: the contracting states are not bound to admit them to
residence (i.e., grant them durable asylum), and no obligation binds other
contracting states to offer resettlement.
Refugees may, therefore, fall into limbo-their status unregularized by
the country of immediate refuge, resettlement denied by other countries,
and return to their country of origin barred by the rule of nonrefoulement.
Unlike the case of the refugee lawfully staying in the territory of a con-
tracting state, the limitations on the power of expulsion under Article 32
do not apply to refugees who have entered illegally. A distinction, howev-
er, must be drawn between the administrative act of ordering expulsion
and actual, physical removal of the refugee. It is at the point of actual
expulsion that the provisions of Article 33 significantly limit states' discre-
tion. This was acknowledged in the Refugee (Germany) Case. 5' The German
court held that a refugee who had obtained an extension of his residence
permit by false statements was not "lawfully" within the Federal Republic
of Germany. The restriction on permissible grounds of expulsion did not,
therefore, apply to him in the manner foreseen by Article 32. Nevertheless,
the court also held that the right inherent in Article 33 was not similarly
tied to lawful presence, and must be interpreted to mean that no refugee,
whether lawfully or unlawfully within the territory, may be expelled to
a place of persecution. An almost identical conclusion was reached in the
1974 United States case, Chim Ming v. Marks. 5 2
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The exceptional privilege of derogation from the principle of nonrefoule-
ment is closely circumscribed. Thus, Article 33(2) expressly provides that
the benefit of nonrefoulement may not be claimed by a refugee, "whom there
are reasonablegrounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country
... or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country." 5 3 By thus indicat-
ing and limiting the circumstances in which the power to derogate may be
exercised, Article 33 emphasizes the preeminence and the normative qual-
ity of the fundamental rule of nonrefoulement. 5 4
Regional Instruments
In addition to the instruments of potentially universal application, regional
instruments may directly or indirectly support the refugee's search for
admission or protect him or her against expulsion. For present purposes the
following brief survey suffices.
The definition of refugee offered by the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol has been incorporated in Article I of the 1969 OAU Convention
on Refugee Problems in Africa. This definition also extends to those com-
pelled to leave their country of origin on account of external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public or-
der. 5 5 Moreover, the grant of asylum is affirmed to be a peaceful and
humanitarian act, and OAU member states are required to use their "best
endeavors" to receive refugees.
Significantly, the principle of nonrefoulement is strongly stated: "No per-
son shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at
the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or
remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be
threatened .... , '56 No express concession is made to overriding considera-
tions of national security, although if a member state finds difficulty "in
continuing to grant asylum," it may appeal directly to other member states
and through the OAU. 5 7
The impact of regional human rights instruments, particularly those
which offer the individual recourse against state action, is also relevant.
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 8 for example,
prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment, and the European Commission
has noted that in certain circumstances, expulsion may infringe that provi-
sion. 59 The American Convention on Human Rights may also be invoked
by the refugee threatened with return to prosecution for political offences
or to a country where his or her right to life or personal freedom is in
danger of violation. 60
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General International Law
As just described, one of UNHCR's roles is to supervise the application of
international conventions benefiting refugees. In monitoring the issues of
entry and removal of refugees, the Office will necessarily rely first upon
the obligations which states have expressly and formally undertaken by
becoming parties to such treaties. But not all states have ratified the 1951
Convention, the 1967 Protocol, or related instruments, and accordingly the
standing in general international law of the basic rules and principles
affecting refugees is next considered.
As argued above, strong evidence supports the concept of a class of
refugees known to general international law, and applicable to all states
regardless of their express consent. In this context, it is of interest to note
that no state claims the right to return a refugee, as such, to persecution.
A state faced with a refugee influx, however, may try to disembarrass itself
of the problem or to assert for itself greater freedom of action by avoiding
any use of refugee terminology. Asylum seekers may thus find themselves
classified as "displaced persons," "illegal immigrants," "quasi-refugees,"
"aliens," "departees," "boat people," or "stowaways." While the intention
is to attempt to retain the broadest discretion to deal with those seeking
entry, the clear implication for states at large is that refugees as a class are
entitled to a somewhat better and higher standard of treatment, as a matter
of general international law.61
The existence of such a class implies, in turn, certain minimum stan-
dards of treatment, including at least observance of the principles of non-
refoulement and temporary refuge. The principle of nonrefoulement is now
examined in both its general international law and conventional rule as-
pects, with a view to determining more precisely: (1) the meaning and
scope of the principle, (2) its standing in general international law, and (3)
its relationship to the institutions of temporary refuge and asylum.
Meaning and Scope of the Principle of Nonrefoulement
The basic meaning of the principle has been stated above in the context
of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, 62 and that core of meaning remains
good for general international law. It is uncertain, however, whether the
notion of refoulement encompasses (1) rejection at the frontier, prior to any
penetration of state territory, 6 3 or (2) extradition of refugees. Antecedents
of the principle of nonrefoulement may certainly be found in the practice of
nonextradition of political offenders which developed in the nineteenth
century, but the precise relation of extradition and refugee status in the
case of nonpolitical crimes has never been clear. 64
At the conference which accepted the 1951 Convention, little, if any
objection was raised to the Swiss interpretation of nonrefoulement, limiting
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its application to those who had already entered state territory. This re-
strictive view was premised on the notion that a state was not obliged to
allow large groups of persons claiming refugee status to cross its fron-
tiers. 65 This interpretation, even then, did not square with the concept of
refoulement in European immigration law and practice, 66 and it was, in any
event, contrary to the letter of Article 3 of the Convention on the Interna-
tional Status of Refugees of 1933.67 However, state practice during this
period was also somewhat equivocal; large numbers of refugees were cer-
tainly admitted, integrated locally or resettled, 68 but major cases of return
to persecution were not unknown. 69
Over the last thirty years the broader interpretation of nonrefoulement has
become increasingly accepted. 70 Large numbers of asylum seekers have
been allowed to cross frontiers, for example, in Africa from the early 1960s
and, more recently, in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the practice of
states and of international organizations has contributed to a progressive
development of the law. Thus, the General Assembly's 1967 Declaration
on Territorial Asylum, which recommends to states that they base their
practices on the principles declared, provides in Article 3(1): "No person
referred to in Article 1, Paragraph 1, shall be subjected to measures such
as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in
which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any state where
he may be subjected to persecution."
Though fundamental to the protection of refugees, nonrefoulement has
never been stated as an absolute principle. "National security" and "public
order" have long been recognized as potential justifications for deroga-
tion. 7 1 Article 3 of the 1967 Declaration, however, while recognizing
"overriding reasons of national security," also appears to authorize an
exteption to nonrefoulement "in order to safeguard the population, as in the
case of a mass influx of persons." 72 Though strongly criticized for its
vagueness, 73 this provision remains of concern in view of latest develop-
ments and the size of recent refugee crises. Nevertheless, given the strong
likelihood of an international response to new crises, coupled with provi-
sion of assistance for local integration, voluntary repatriation, or resettle-
ment projects in other states, a mass influx in itself should not be
considered sufficient to justify refoulement.
It is trite knowledge that resolutions of the General Assembly, such as
that adopting the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, have no direct,
legally binding force. However, most commentators concur in the conclu-
sion that they create an expectation of observance in good faith, particular-
ly if adopted unanimously. 74 While in recent years there have been
exceptions to the principles of nonrefoulement and nonrejection at the fron-
tier, these have generally been vigorously protested by other states and by
UNHCR. In October 1979, for example, Thailand announced the reversal
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of a policy which had led earlier in the year to the forcible return of some
40,000 Kampucheans; henceforth, all asylum seekers were to be allowed
to enter. 7 More recently, staggering numbers have been allowed to cross
international frontiers without let or hindrance: as of December 1, 1980,
1,309,505 Afghans had been admitted to Pakistan; and some 1,077,351
Ethiopians to Somalia. 76
In 1977, the Executive Committee reaffirmed the importance of observ-
ing nonrefoulement, irrespective of whether the persons affected had been
formally recognized as refugees. 77 Since that year, too, the General Assem-
bly has repeatedly urged governments scrupulously to observe
humanitarian principles, including the grant of asylum to those seeking
refuge and nonrefoulement. 78 By and large, the international community, in
its practice and its statements, appears to have recognized that the principle
applies not only to the broad class of asylum seekers described above, but
also to the moment at which those asylum seekers present themselves for
entry. In both cases, certain factual elements may be necessary (for exam-
ple, evidence of relevant or valid reasons for flight, such as human rights
violations in the country of origin) before the principle of nonrefoulement is
triggered, but developments in that concept and in the definition of refugee
cannot be ignored. 79
The Principle of Nonrefoulment
in General Internalional Law
Much of the evidence concerning the scope and meaning of the principle
likewise supports the argument that today nonrefoulement is a principle of
general or customary international law. There is substantial, if not conclu-
sive, authority that the principle is binding on all states, independently of
specific assent. Pre-1951 state practice is perhaps equivocal as to whether,
in that year, it could be said that Article 33 of the Convention reflected or
crystallized a rule of customary international law. 80 The practice of states
since then and, in particular, that of international organizations such as
UNHCR, however, are persuasive evidence of opinio juris, even in the ab-
sence of any formal judicial pronouncement. Article 33 is of a "fundamen-
tally norm-creating character."' That refoulement may be permitted in
exceptional circumstances does not deny this premise. Instead, it indicates
the boundaries of discretion. Moreover, according to Article 42 of the
Convention, no reservations may be made to Article 33.82
The practice examined above nevertheless has been fairly selective. The
position of certain states is far from clear, even though United Nations
resolutions on asylum and UNHCR have been adopted unanimously or by
consensus in the appropriate international fora. 83 The practice of East
European and Communist states, for example, remains difficult to assess.
The constitutions of such countries frequently acknowledge the principle
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of asylum; 84 thus there is an awareness of the institution and recognition
of a class of persons worthy of protection. On the other hand, the political
offense exception which is closely related to the principle of protection of
refugees, 8 5 finds no place in the extradition arrangements existing between
such states. 86 One commentator has also noted that, constitutional provi-
sions notwithstanding, asylum in Communist countries may be refused to
one who, though anticapitalist, refuses to espouse communism. 8 7
At the 1977 United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum, some
states pressed for the inclusion of a specific article which would protect
refugees against extradition to a country in which they might face persecu-
tion. 88 The German Democratic Republic and the USSR, however, both
proposed amendments to the draft article on nonrefoulement which would
have reiterated the paramouncy of states' extradition obligations. 8 9 In any
event, the conference was unable to complete its work and these conflict-
ing approaches were not resolved.
Another potential challenge to the argument that the fundamental prin-
ciples of refugee law are part of customary international law is the so-
called "right of unilateral qualification." Article 1(3) of the 1967 Declara-
tion on Territorial Asylum declares that, "It shall rest with the state grant-
ing asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of asylum." 90 This
provision, which Poland introduced during discussions in the Third Com-
mittee, is of uncertain scope. Insofar as the grant of asylum remains discre-
tionary and a manifestation of sovereignty by the territorial state, it is
redundant. 91 Some commentators fear, however, that, rather than facili-
tate a liberal policy on asylum, such a provision might be invoked to justify
decisions to refuse asylum. 92 The varying and disparate interpretations of
"political offense" in the related field of extradition, and the tendency for
that concept to become dominated by political considerations, emphasize
how, in the absence of directly applicable international standards, states'
discretion may remain paramount.
If it is accepted that each state remains absolutely free to determine the
status of asylum seekers and either to abide by or ignore the principle of
nonrefoulement, then the refugee's status in international law is denied and
the standing, authority, and effectiveness of UNHCR are seriously under-
mined. The weight of the evidence, though, is in favor of the limits to
discretion which flow from an international definition of the refugee and
from the generally accepted practice of nonrefoulement. That certain gray
areas exist in the formulation of nonrefoulementis not conclusive evidence of
its lack of status in general international law. As Brierly noted some fifty-
six years ago, "the principles of international law are not susceptible of
precise formulation. . . . [The] rules are . . . constantly changing and
modelling themselves on the everchanging needs of international life." 93
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Nonrefoulemenlt Temporary Refuge, and Asylum
UNHCR seeks permanent solutions to the problems of refugees. No rule
as yet obliges a state to grant asylum, in the sense of secure residence and
protection, but the principle of nonrefoulement does proscribe the return of
asylum seekers to persecution. "Temporary refuge" is the logical and
necessary corollary in this otherwise incomplete regime, although hitherto
it has been the subject of little inquiry. 94 A recent Australian initiative 95
highlights the need for further elaboration of the concept, which is clearly
already present in the practice of states. The Australians propose that,
while the fundamental principle of nonrefoulement should be maintained, the
obligations of states to assist countries of first asylum should be clarified
on the basis of principles of international solidarity and equitable burden
sharing. 96
Understandably, perhaps, some fear that developments such as the
Australian initiative may undermine the principle of nonrefoulemeni and lead
states to consider their humanitarian obligations fulfilled by temporary
refuge rather than by the grant of durable asylum. However, it should be
possible to avoid these tendencies by carefully developing the concept and
its implications. A distinction does remain between, on the one hand,
refugee status and its implied protection against refoulemen, and, on the
other hand, permanent asylum in the sense of secure lawful residence, and
all the rights which derive from refugee status in accordance with the
relevant international instruments.
ASYLUM AND THE DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE STATUS
The individualism of the refugee definition, supposing a dispassionate
case-by-case examination of subjective and objective elements, has been
noted above. Obviously, individual assessment may be impractical in the
case of a large-scale influx, but even here there is a need for certain
minimum standards of procedure. 97 A principal objective of UNHCR is
the establishment within states of formal procedures for the determination
of refugee status. Clearly, where such procedures exist, they help ensure
that refugees are both protected against refoulement and guaranteed the
rights and benefits provided by international instruments.
At its major session on protection in 1977, the Executive Committee of
the High Commissioner's Programme expressed the hope that all states
parties to the Convention and Protocol that had not done so would estab-
lish such procedures in the near future and also give favorable considera-
tion to UNHCR participation. The committee further recommended that
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procedures meet certain basic requirements, which are set out in the Annex
to this article.
The procedures described in this part are those with which the author
is most familiar and they illustrate the variety of methods which may be
chosen by states to deal with applications for refugee status. 98 The follow-
ing survey does not deal with the general issue of implementation of the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in national law, a question which
may cause acute concern in states where ratification of treaties has no
direct effect in municipal law.
Australia
Legal Background
Neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol has been expressly
incorporated into Australian municipal law. Therefore, the entry of ref-
ugees falls within the broad discretionary provisions of the Migration Act
of 1958, as amended. 99 The responsible authority is the minister for immi-
gration and ethnic affairs; a more or less parallel competence to grant
"political asylum" resides in the minister for foreign affairs, but it is rarely
used and applicants for asylum/refugee status are now processed under a
single procedure.
In May 1977, the minister for immigration and ethnic affairs announced
the creation of a standing interdepartmental committee to evaluate claims
to refugee status under the Convention, and to make appropriate recom-
mendations. Later the same year, interdepartmental discussions, in which
UNHCR also participated, resulted in the establishment of the Determina-
tion of Refugee Status (DORS) Committee and in agreement on procedural
rules. 100 The committee began assessing applications for refugee status in
1978, and now meets regularly in Canberra. '0 1 The determinations and
advice of the DORS Committee do not have the force of law, but in
practice those recognized as refugees by the minister, on the recommenda-
tion of the committee, have been accorded residence status in Australia.
Procedure
Application for refugee status may be made (1) on arrival at a port of entry,
(2) after entry, either during the currency of any temporary permission to
remain or after its expiry, and (3) after the initiation of deportation ma-
chinery. 102 According to guidelines established in 1977, every applicant is
interviewed on the basis of his or her claim; that interview is then tran-
scribed, acknowledged as accurate by signature of the applicant, and re-
ferred to the DORS Committee. Interviews are generally conducted by
officers at the state level of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs, while the committee hitherto has always sat in Canberra. Appli-
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cants are interviewed where necessary with the aid of interpreters, and
they are entitled to be accompanied by a legal adviser of their choice.
The DORS Committee itself is chaired by an official from the Depart-
ment of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, while other members represent
the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Attorney-General's Department,
and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The representative in
Australia of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is also
entitled to attend meetings of the DORS Committee in an observer capaci-
ty, and to make known the views of the Office.
The DORS Committee is required to apply the definition of "refugee"
set out in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by the 1967
Protocol. It considers applications on the basis of the interview report and
such other information as may be put before it, but the applicant does not
usually appear before the committee. Decision on each application is by
majority vote (with the chair holding a casting vote in the event of a tied
decision), and the committee may decide either to accept, reject, or to defer
an application for further inquiries. In addition, the committee is expressly
empowered to recommend that an applicant whose claim to refugee status
is rejected nevertheless, should be allowed to remain temporarily or per-
manently in Australia on humanitarian or compassionate grounds. The
minister for immigration and ethnic affairs retains overall responsibility
and may therefore accept or reject the committee's recommendation. Nor
is the question of residence for those accepted or rejected decided by the
committee, although it is evident in practice that a favorable recommenda-
tion on refugee status creates a strong presumption that asylum will be
granted.
Appeal
There is at present no right of appeal against an adverse decision of the
DORS Committee, and the only formal provision in this regard empowers
the minister to refer back for reconsideration any case for which new
information is received. However, certain classes of claimants to refugee
status may raise the issue in court, on appeal against deportation. The
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act of 1975 103 introduced a limited right
of appeal against deportation on behalf of aliens convicted of crimes and
of immigrants in certain other specified cases. 104 But the right of appeal
does not extend to one who wished to challenge removal from the country
following illegal entry or on becoming a prohibited immigrant. 105
In a recent judgment, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal expressly
considered relevant provisions of the 1951 Convention on expulsion and
refoulement, although these are not formally a part of Australian law. 10 6 As
the appellant lost on the merits of the case, whether an applicant for
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refugee status is able to rely successfully on the Convention and Protocol
remains undecided. 107
Belgium
Legal Background
The legal basis for determining refugee status is established by a series of
enactments which adopted the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and
established the conditions of entry, residence, and establishmentof foreign
nationals in Belgium. 10 8 Article 3 of the 1953 law appoints the minister of
foreign affairs as the the sole authority to determine refugee status, but
also provides that the minister may delegate that competence to the inter-
national authority entrusted by the United Nations with protecting ref-
ugees. 109 This power has been duly exercised in favor of the UNHCR
representative in Belgium. 110
Procedure
All applications for refugee status are first examined by the Ministry of
Justice with a view to determining their admissibility: applications must
be made without delay (within forty-eight hours of entry, or within two
weeks of the change of circumstances in the country of origin which are
alleged to give rise to a fear of persecution on return), and Belgium must
be the country of first asylum."'
Admissible cases are referred to the UNHCR Office in Brussels, where
asylum seekers are interviewed and complete a detailed application form.
If the application is considered manifestly ill-founded, the Ministry of
Justice may initially decide to proceed no further with the case. If this
initial decision is contested, and in all other cases, the UNHCR representa-
tive will then determine the issue of refugee status. If recognition is accord-
ed, the UNHCR Branch Office will issue a certificate attesting thereto. The
decision on recognition is directly effective in Belgian law, and as a conse-
quence, the recognized refugee is granted residence.
Appeal
While no formal right of appeal is accorded by Belgian law, in practice any
asylum seeker whose application has been rejected may request the
UNHCR representative to review the decision. Cases are reopened (1) if
new facts or evidence are adduced which, had they been known during the
first examination of the case, would have led to a favorable decision, or (2)
if it appears that an error or misunderstanding has occurred. The appellant
is permitted to remain in the country pending review of the case.
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France
Legal Background
The legal bases for the determination of refugee status and for the grant
of asylum in France are the 1958 Constitution, the Preamble of which
includes a statement of the principle of asylum, and a series of operating
laws and administrative decrees. 112
The competent authority for determining refugee status is the Office
Fran;ais de Protection des Rifugiis et Apatrides (OFPRA), a public authority at-
tached to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but with its own legal personality
and financial and administrative autonomy. 113 The director of OFPRA is
assisted by a council which approves the budget and the accounts of the
office, advises generally on the running of the office and on determination
of refugee status, and proposes to the government any measures aimed at
improving the situation of refugees. It is chaired by a representative of the
minister of foreign affairs and comprises representatives of the ministers
of justice, interior, finance, labor, and health and a representative of volun-
tary organizations dealing with refugees. The UNHCR representative at-
tends the council meetings and is entitled to present observations and
proposals. 114
OFPRA provides legal and administrative protection to refugees and
stateless persons and ensures the execution of international agreements on
the protection of refugees. It determines and certifies the refugee status of
any applicant who meets the definition of refugee in Article 1 of the 1951
Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, cooperates with UNHCR
and is subject to its supervision (estsoumis h sa surveillance) in accordance with
international agreements. 115
An applicant who is refused recognition has a right of appeal to the
Appeals Commission (Commission des Recours), composed of a member of the
French Council of State (Conseil d 'Eat), who acts as president, a representa-
tive of UNHCR and a representative appointed by the OFPRA Council. 116
The Commission des Recours is also empowered to give advisory opinions on
cases of refugees affected by measures coming within the purview of
Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the 1951 Convention (e.g., restrictions on freedom
of movement and expulsion orders). The execution of such measures is
suspended pending the commission's advice. 117
Procedure
Applications for refugee status and asylum may be made initially at the
local police authority (prifeclure de police) at the time of request for residence.
Circular no. 74-378 from the minister of the interior to the prefects of
dipartemenls recalls the "rules concerning the role of frontier officials when
faced with an alien requesting asylum," and emphasizes that "there is of
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course no question of sending a refugee back to the country from which
he has had to flee." 118 Some latitude on refusal of entry exists where the
refugee does not come directly from a country of persecution and can be
returned to another country without risk of being sent on to danger.
Otherwise, however, frontier officials must refer those seeking asylum to
the prifecture of the locality where they wish to reside, and issue them a
safe-conduct if they are without proper documentation. 119
The role of the prdfecture is largely formal. On receipt of the application
for residence and recognition as a refugee, the asylum seeker is issued a
provisional permit or a written acknowledgement (ricepissd de demande de carte
de sjour) by the pri/feture, both of which may be valid for one to three months
and are renewable. The asylum seeker is then referred to OFPRA where
formal application for recognition as a refugee is made. It is the responsibil-
ity of the asylum seeker to ensure the completion of his or her case by
providing photographs, photocopy of temporary residence permit if held,
passport or other travel document, any papers relating to the circumstances
of departure from the country of origin, and any supplementary informa-
tion requested by OFPRA. An interview with OFPRA usually takes place
only if the asylum seeker so requests.
From the date on which the case file is completed, the law allows a
maximum period of four months for decision. If nothing has been heard
by then, the asylum seeker may take this as an implicit rejection and enter
an appeal. Where the decision is positive, the asylum seeker is issued a
Ceriflcat de rifugie, valid generally for three years and renewable. 120 In the
event of a negative decision or where no decision is given within four
months, the asylum seeker has one month within which to exercise the
right of appeal. ' 2 '
Appeal
The Commission des Recours has two functions: 122 to decide on appeals against
refusal to recognize the status of refugee, and to advise on the application
to refugees of measures such as expulsion and assignation d risidence in the
light of Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the 1951 Convention. 12 In the first case
the right must be exercised within one month and in the second within one
week. 124
The basic procedure for appeals is set out in Decree no. 53-377. Hearings
are in public, although closed sessions can be required. Three parties may
be present before the Commission des Recours: a rapporteur, 125 the appellant and
his or her representative, and a representative of the director of OFPRA.
The rapporteur is provided with copies of the appellant's grounds of appeal
and annexes (the recours) and the observations of OFPRA. After the rappor-
teur states the case and makes or does not make a recommendation, the
appellant, either alone or through counsel, presents his or her claim. The
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commission commonly questions appellants and also has the power to ask
for supplementary inquiries. The OFPRA representative may also present
the views of that office to the commission, which will generally reserve its
decision. The decision itself must be given in public and must be reason-
ed. 126
The decision (or, in the case of a request, the advisory opinion) and its
reasons are then communicated to the appellant and to OFPRA (or the
Ministry of the Interior). If the decision recognizes the appellant's refugee
status, OFPRA is required to issue immediately a Cerhiicat de rifugi.
Recognition as a refugee does not automatically entail the right to
permanent residence. Application for a regular residence permit must again
be made to the local prifecture de police, and in certain circumstances, it may
be refused. Previously, the issue of the ordinary resident's permit was
conditional upon the applicant having either a work permit or a place as
a student (and funds for support during the course of study). Until the
refugee was established in employment or as a student, the provisional
residence permit or ricipissi was usually extended for periods of three
months at a time. However, it has recently been announced that the issue
of a Cerh/ficat de rifugij will result in the issue of a work permit without
further formalities. 127
The discretion of the authorities generally to refuse asylum or to impose
other administrative sanctions on refugees is closely circumscribed. Circu-
lar no. 74-378 emphasizes that such cases will be exceptional, and that any
decision to refuse residence should be submitted to the minister of the
interior. 128 Likewise, any proposal to expel must be referred and, as has
been noted above, the refugee concerned has the right to appeal by an
expedited procedure to the Commission des Recours, which in turn may give
an advisory opinion as to whether the measures in question should be
maintained. 129
Federal Republic of Germany
Legal Background
The legal bases for the determination of refugee status and the grant of
asylum are the Federal Constitution (Bonner Grundgesetz) 130 and the Aliens
Law of 1965 (AusIdndergesetz)'3 which has since been considerably amend-
ed. 132 The Aliens Law provides that refugees in the sense of Article 1 of
the 1951 Convention and other foreign nationals who come within Article
16 of the Federal Constitution are entitled to asylum. 133
The competent authority for the determination of refugee status is the
Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (Bundesamt fur die
Anerkennung Ausldndischer Fliichtlinge, established at Zirndorf, Bavaria. The
Bundesamt is provided for by article 29 of the Aliens Law and its director
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appointed by the federal minister of the interior. The federal minister also
issues regulations governing procedure before the Bundesam, but in all
other respects the agency enjoys complete independence in determining
the status of persons seeking asylum.
Decisions on refugee status are now taken by a single, independent
Bundesam official. The proceedings are not public, but the right to attend
is granted to federal and state (Land) representatives and to UNHCR. The
federal interest is represented by the federal commissioner for asylum
affairs (Bundesbeaufiragterfiir Asylangelegenheiten) who is appointed by the min-
ister of the interior and who must possess the qualifications for judicial or
other high administrative office. 134 This officer is entitled to participate in
proceedings before the Bundesami and before the administrative courts, and
has the right to initiate proceedings before the courts.
Procedure
An asylum seeker's initial contact is normally with the border police or
local aliens authority, and the law requires that applicants should present
themselves promptly. Since 1977, aliens authorities have enjoyed greater
freedom to "pre-screen" applicants for refugee status/asylum; this allows
the authorities to expel those whose applications are manifestly an abuse
of legal process (offensichtlich rechismissbrduchlich}. 135 The provision remains
controversial; previously, aliens authorities tended not to rule on the issue
of abuse (which has been interpreted narrowly by the courts), but to remit
the issue for decision by the Bundesam. Where the "prescreening" is passed
the application for asylum/refugee status is referred to the Bundesam. The
agency now has discretion to interview the asylum seeker personally, but
otherwise the initial decision is based on written statements as to back-
ground, reasons for departure, and unwillingness to return. A time limit
applies, and statements or other evidence submitted thereafter will not be
considered. 136
When the file is completed, it is considered by the decision-making
authority-the single official referred to above. The asylum seeker has a
right to be heard if he or she so wishes and may be represented by counsel.
The decision. to recognize as a "person entitled to asylum" (Asylbgrechhgle}
or to refuse recognition must be in writing, must state the facts clearly, and
must set out the relevant evidence; reasons must be given and the decision
must be justified in law. 13 7 Deportation proceedings may be initiated upon
the announcement of a negative decision.
Appeals
In the event of an adverse decision, the individual applicant may exer-
cise a right of appeal to the administrative court competent for the area of
his or her residence; likewise, the federal commissioner may appeal, either
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against recognition or against the refusal to recognize. From the adminis-
trative court appeal lies to the higher administrative court (Verwaltungs-
gerichtsho!) of the Land, unless the court of first instance rules unanimously
that the application is manifestly ill-founded. 138 If that court gives leave,
a further appeal lies to the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht) in Berlin. Yet one more appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgerichl) is less likely now that that Court has ruled that the
constitutional provision on asylum covers the same ground as the law
implementing the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.
Recognition as a refugee, as Asylberechigle, imports certain legal conse-
quences and is binding in all save extradition proceedings. 139 Those so
recognized are entitled to be issued a residence permit valid for five years
and enjoy the legal status provided by the 1951 Convention. ' 40 Such
status may be terminated only through revocation proceedings initiated by
the director of the Bundesamt and these will succeed only where there has
been a change in the circumstances on which recognition was founded, or
where it was based on incorrect statements or concealment of material
facts. 141
The concept of Asylberechtigte does not embrace every refugee within the
meaning of the Convention and excludes those who have been recognized
in another state or who have found protection elsewhere. 142 While this
exception is sufficient and acceptable for the purpose of justifying a refusal
to grant asylum (residence), clearly it may not be relevant in deportation
proceedings. Accordingly, the application of the principle of nonrefoulement
even to the refugee who does not qualify as Asylberechhgte is recognized in
the law, and limitations on the power of expulsion are prescribed in regard
to all aliens whose life or freedom would be threatened within the meaning
of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention. 143
The United Kingdom
Background
Neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol are incorporated in
United Kingdom law, and the entry, residence, and removal of foreign
nationals is subject to control under the Immigration Act of 1971.144 The
immigration rules implementing the Act, however, do acknowledge that
there may be a class of persons who should be admitted, allowed to remain,
or not deported on account of a well-founded fear of persecution.
Procedure
At a port of entry, two types of asylum claims may be made, by those with
visas and those without visas. A visa national may claim asylum immedi-
ately upon arrival, or the intention not to return to the country of origin
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may emerge in the course of questioning by the immigration officer. Gen-
erally, from an immigration law perspective, that the applicant resorted to
misrepresentation in order to secure a visa is sufficient ground for refusal
of admission. However, recent changes in the immigration rules stress that
the immigration officer should refer any case which may appear to fall
within the asylum provisions to the central authority, the Home Office, for
decision regardless of the grounds which may justify exclusion. 145
Moreover, every visa national in possession of a valid visa has a right
of appeal against refusal of entry exercisable in the United Kingdom, 146
and notice of such appeals as involve claims to asylum is given to the
UNHCR Branch Office in London. The critical factor separating the non-
visa national from the visa national who seeks asylum lies in the character
of their rights of appeal. In the case of nonvisa nationals, such right may
be exercised only after they have left the country. 147 Immigration law and practice
indicate the port of embarkation as the "normal" destination of those
refused entry. 148 For the asylum seeker this may be the country of origin
or some transit state, and again only the visa national may appeal against
destination while still in the United Kingdom. 149
An asylum seeker who has secured admission may raise the fear of
persecution either in the course of an application for an extension of his
permission to stay in the United Kingdom or as a ground of objection to
deportation. Asylum seekers are interviewed by Home Office officials or
immigration officers, but the interview report is not submitted to the
asylum seeker for comment or correction. Decisions on refugee status are
taken at a senior level within the Home Office. If positive, the refugee will
usually be given a (renewable) stay for twelve months, with permission to
work, and a formal letter attesting to the recognition of refugee status may
also be issued. 150
The issue of refugee status/asylum may also arise in deportation pro-
ceedings. Foreign nationals are liable to deportation (1) for breach of condi-
tions of admission or overstaying; (2) on "public good" grounds including
national security and political reasons; (3) as the family member of another
person who is or has been ordered to be deported; (4) following the recom-
mendation of a court made on conviction for any offense punishable with
imprisonment. '5 '
There is no right of appeal if the secretary of state certifies that deporta-
tion is conducive to the public good 152 or where a deportation order is
made following the recommendation of a court upon conviction of the
alien. The recommendation itself may be appealed against as a part of the
sentence imposed by the court, but a superior court has ruled that the
decision to order deportation is solely at the discretion of the secretary of
state, not for the court which either recommends deportation or hears an
appeal against such recommendation. 153 There is also no right of appeal
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exercisable within the United Kingdom by illegal entrants (which includes
those who may have entered on a false passport). They are liable to deten-
tion and summary removal. ' 5 4
Appeals
Within the above-mentioned limitations, an asylum seeker who is refused
an extension of stay may appeal provided that both the application and
the Home Office decision were made while the applicant still had permis-
sion to be in the country and that notice of intention to appeal is given
within fourteen days of the negative decision. A refugee or asylum seeker
may appeal against the making of a deportation order provided notice is
given in time.
All appeals, whether involving refugees, aliens or Commonwealth citi-
zens, are generally heard first by immigration appeals adjudicators. From
their decisions, an appeal lies to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 155
Decisions of the tribunal may be subject to judicial review in the superior
courts by way of application for orders of certiorari and mandamus. 156
According to the rules of procedure, the United Kingdom representative
of the UNHCR may elect to be treated as a party to any appeal in which
the appellant is or claims to be a refugee. 157 As noted above, the UNHCR
Branch Office is advised of all asylum appeals. United Kingdom immigra-
tion law is of general application and, in common with that of many other
states, makes no special provision for refugees. That law must therefore be
supplemented by the use of administrative discretion, both to avoid the
application of the general law (i.e., to prevent prosecution, removal, or
detention) and to secure those benefits called for by the Convention and
Protocol; in such circumstances, the role of UNHCR may be that much
more acute.
United States
Legal background
Radical changes in the legal regime governing the admission of refugees
and the processing of asylum seekers were effected in the United States
with the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act,' 5 8 and with the ensuing
establishment of an ayslum procedure. 159 For the first time, United States
legislation expressly incorporates the substance of the refugee definition
found in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol; it also makes specific
provision for annual intakes of refugees from among groups of special
humanitarian concern to the United States. 160 A detailed analysis of the
legislation appears elsewhere in this volume. 161
Jurisdiction in the determination of asylum requests resides either with
the appropriate district director of the Immigration and Naturalization
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Service (INS) having responsibility for the particular port of entry or area
of residence of the applicant; or, if exclusion or deportation proceedings
have been commenced, with the immigration judge. 162 The criterion for
the grant of asylum is qualification as a refugee within the meaning of the
Act, subject to exceptions in respect of those who, broadly speaking, come
within the "exclusion clauses" of the 1951 Convention 163 or the permissi-
ble grounds of derogation from the principle of nonrefoulement. 164
Procedural Aspects
Neither the Act nor the regulations make any express provision for the
involvement of UNHCR in the decision-making process, whether in an
advisory, observer, or other capacity. However, a limited practice has
developed over the years whereby the Department of State refers certain
classes of cases to the UNHCR Representative for an advisory opinion.
UNHCR also submitted its views in the prelegislative phase on the draft-
ing of the Refugee Act and on the asylum procedure introduced by the
interim regulations.
The cases hitherto referred to UNHCR have principally involved Hai-
tians and Cubans. Following the arrival of large numbers of Cubans in the
United States in early 1980, UNHCR was requested by the authorities, inter
alia, to advise on asylum applications which were likely to be refused on
account of the applicants' criminal background. 165 There were a number
of unusual features to this exercise, in which the writer was closely in-
volved during June and July of 1980. First, the large numbers of applicants
militated against individual case-by-case assessment and a decision was
subsequently taken to accord the majority of asylum seekers an interim
status in anticipation of their situation being regularized by special legisla-
tion. 166 Secondly, the approach to the question of exclusion or denial of
asylum was somewhat unusual, in that it involved examination of appli-
cants' criminal backgrounds prior to, rather than after, assessment of the
well-foundedness of their claims to be refugees. The following account
summarizes some of the work accomplished in this joint UNHCR/State
Department exercise.
United States and UNHCR Cooperation
Article i(F) of the 1951 Convention provides that the Convention "shall
not apply to any person with respect whom there are serious reasons for
considering that ... (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee." 167 The Refugee Act of 1980 employs this exclusion clause in the
context of an exception to the prohibition on the deportation or return of
an alien to a country in which his or her life or freedom may be threat-
ened. 16 8 Section 208.8 of the Interim Regulations governing Refugee and
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Asylum Procedures also adopts the exclusion clause as the basis for the
denial of asylum. 169
In general, before examining the applicability of the exclusion clause of
the 1951 Convention, it is usual to consider whether the applicant for
asylum or refugee status comes within the scope of the "inclusion clauses,"
that is, whether the person concerned fulfills the criterion of "well-found-
ed fear of persecution." In applying the exclusion clause, it is also neces-
sary to strike a balance between the nature of the offenses presumed to
have been committed by the applicant and the degree of persecution
feared. A crime must be very grave indeed for a person to be excluded who
has a well-founded fear of very severe persecution, for example, such as
would endanger his or her life or freedom. On the other hand, if the
persecution feared is less serious, then the nature of the crime or crimes
in question should be assessed in order to establish whether criminal
character in fact outweighs the applicant's character as a bona fide refugee.
It is debatable whether in practice the applicability of Article 1(F)(c) can
be effectively assessed in isolation, without at the same time taking into
account the substance of the claim to refugee status, including the degree
of persecution feared.
The phrase "serious non-political crime" is not easy to define, given the
different connotations of the term "crime" in different legal systems. 170
However, finally, the standard to be applied is an international standard,
in the sense that a provision of a multilateral treaty is involved, although
clearly account may also be taken of standards relating to criminal prose-
cution and treatment of offenders current in the potential country of
asylum. In dealing with cases, the basic principle should be to consider
each on its merits, taking due account of both mitigating and aggravating
factors. 171
With a view to promoting consistent decisions, UNHCR proposed that
a presumption of serious nonpolitical crime might be considered as raised
by evidence of commission of any of the following offences: homicide,
rape, child molesting, wounding, arson, drugs traffic, and armed robbery.
However, that presumption might be rebutted by evidence of mitigating
factors, some of which are set out below. It was also proposed that the
following offenses might be considered to constitute serious nonpolitical
crimes, provided other factors were present: breaking and entering (bur-
glary), stealing (theft and simple robbery), receiving stolen property,
embezzlement, drugs possession and use, and assault. Factors which would
support a finding of seriousness include use of weapons, injury to persons,
value of property involved, type of drugs involved, 172 and evidence of
habitual criminal conduct. With respect to all cases, the following elements
were suggested as tending to rebut a presumption or finding of serious
crime: age of the offender (minority), parole, elapse of five years since
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conviction or completion of sentence, general good character (e.g., one
offense only), that the offender was merely an accomplice, and other
circumstances surrounding commission of the offense, for example, provo-
cation and self-defense.
During a period of some seven weeks, 1,021 cases were examined jointly
by UNHCR and officials of the State Department on the basis of evidence
provided by the applicants at interview. The greater part of the caseload
provided few problems, in that the commission of serious crimes was
clearly indicated. A number of other cases, however, were discussed at
length, resulting in final agreement on the serious or nonserious nature of
the crime, or in deferral for further inquiries and reinterview regarding
either the circumstances of the offense or political and refugee elements.
Any applicant refused asylum on the ground that he or she had committed
a serious nonpolitical crime prior to entry could have that issue redeter-
mined in exclusion or deportation proceedings.
Summary Conclusions Regarding Participation
by UNHCR in Procedures for the Determination
of Refugee Status
Participation in procedures for the determination of refugee status derives
sensibly from UNHCR's supervisory role and from states' obligation to
cooperate with the Office. It allows UNHCR to play a close monitoring role
in matters of status and of the entry and removal of asylum -seekers. The
procedures themselves will differ, necessarily, in the light of states' own
administrative and judicial framework; so too will the nature and degree
of involvement of UNHCR. However, the fundamental issue remains the
same-identifying those who should benefit from recognition of their
refugee status, and ensuring, so far as is practical, consistent and generous
interpretations of essentially international criteria.
As was noted above, Belgium has a unique arrangement for it is the local
UNHCR representative who determines refugee status. In France, the de-
termining authority is expressly subjected to the supervision of UNHCR,
while the local representative is also a full voting member of the Commission
des Recours. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the law provides expressly
for asylum seekers to be given the opportunity to contact UNHCR and,
while prescribing closed sessions generally for the recognition process,
declares that the UNHCR representative shall be entitled to attend. In the
United Kingdom, UNHCR may elect to be a party to proceedings before
the immigration appeal authorities, while in the United States, UNHCR's
involvement in an advisory capacity is gradually developing. In many
other states, UNHCR's role may be less formal. Even where no procedure
as such exists, or where UNHCR maintains no presence, the Office never-
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theless holds a watching brief in all matters affecting refugees; should there
arise cause for concern, then appropriate interventions will be made, either
locally or through the permanent diplomatic missions in Geneva.
In a document submitted to the 1980 session of the Executive Commit-
tee, 173 the procedures of thirty-two states are described and, roughly
speaking, UNHCR involvement falls into the following categories: (1) no
formal role-eight states; (2) observer on advisory committee or similar
body-eleven states; (3) full member of appeal body-three states; (4)
UNHCR determines status-three states (including one state in which
decisions are jointly taken); (5) UNHCR is informed of cases or its views
may be sought or given or it may be invited to attend decision-making
bodies-seven states.
Considered broadly, the role of UNHCR in such procedures is to con-
tribute to the effective identification of bona fide refugees. This may entail
(1) offering an assessment of the applicant's credibility in the light of the
claim and of conditions known to exist in his or her country of origin; (2)
providing information on the treatment of similar cases or similar legal
points in other jurisdictions; (3) representing the international com-
munity's interest by providing UNHCR's interpretation of fundamental
concepts, such as "well-founded fear"; and (4) promoting a liberal inter-
pretation of humanitarian instruments (which includes giving the benefit
of the doubt in appropriate cases), as well as a generous policy on asylum.
Evidently, the burden is on the applicant to establish his or her case, but
given the practical problems as well as the trauma which a person in flight
may face, a corresponding duty also rests upon those charged with ascer-
taining and evaluating the relevant facts. 174 Providing international pro-
tection may thus include helping those unable, for one reason or another,
to help themselves, in order to ensure that no bona fide refugee is returned
to a place in which he or she may have reason to fear persecution.
THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Three principal points of general international law have been canvassed
above: (1) that there is an international legal definition of refugees applica-
ble to all states; (2) that there is a general principle of international law
obliging states to grant temporary refuge to asylum seekers and not to
return them to where their lives or freedom may be endangered; and (3)
that UNHCR enjoys universal jurisdiction to provide international protec-
tion to refugees.
In respect to each of these premises one factor is missing: to whom are
the obligations in question owed? The individual is still not considered to
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be a subject of international law, capable of enforcing his or her rights on
the international plane. 175 Nevertheless, the problems which refugees are
likely to face are not such as would prompt the exercise of the right of
diplomatic protection on the part of the state of nationality. Whether
another state or subject of international law exists with the competence to
assert its own or the individual refugee's rights against a delinquent state
is the central issue.
With regard to the states parties to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol, the existence of obligations inter se may be assumed. Moreover,
both instruments expressly provide for the settlement of disputes relating
to their interpretation or application, and for reference to the International
Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute,
should other means of settlement fail. 176 No litigation has resulted, and,
in the absence of injury to an individual related to a claimant state by the
link of nationality, the results of any such litigation are likely to be without
practical consequence. 177 However, there are precedents for the view that
states may yet have legal interests in matters other than those which affect
directly their material interests. 178
Under Article 24 of the European Convention on Human Rights, any
contracting state may refer to the European Commission an alleged breach
of the Convention by another party. The instrument itself thus provides
for the emergence of a "European public order," a regime in which all
states parties have a sufficient interest in the observance of the European
Convention's provisions to allow for the assertion of claims. While there
are similarities in the objectives of the European Convention and the
refugee conventions-both call for certain standards of treatment to be
accorded to certain groups of persons-the refugee conventions lack effec-
tive investigation, adjudication, and enforcement procedures; they can
hardly be considered to offer the same opportunity for judicial or quasi-
judicial solutions. At the same time, although UNHCR is accorded a super-
visory role in the application of the Convention and Protocol, it is not a
party to those instruments. For the advancement of UNHCR claims to be
acceptable it needs a sure foundation in the general law.
UNHCR does enjoy, by derivation and intention, international person-
ality. As a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, its "personality" (its
capacity to possess international rights and duties) can be traced to the
United Nations organization at large. 179 Moreover, its statute shows that
the Office was intended by the General Assembly to act on the internation-
al plane. '8 0 The standing of the Office in matters of international protec-
tion has been amply reinforced by successive General Assembly
resolutions calling on all states to cooperate with the High Commissioner
in the performance of his other functions. 181 The "effective discharge" 1
82
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of these functions may in turn require capacity to assert international
claims on behalf of individuals falling within the competence of the Office.
At this point, it is tempting to invoke a dictum of the International
Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction Case, 183 and to argue that, in view
of the importance of the rights involved, all states have an interest in their
protection; 184 and that UNHCR, by express agreement of some states and
by the acquiescence of others, is the qualified representative of the "inter-
national public order" in such matters. As yet, no cogent theory of respon-
sibility has been developed to cover this situation. The legal consequences
that may flow from a breach of the international obligations in question
remain unclear.
International claims may take the form of protest, a call for an inquiry,
negotiation, or a request for submission to arbitration or to the Internation-
al Court of Justice. Both the nature of breaches of obligation affecting
refugees and the nature of the protecting organization rule out certain
types of claims, such as arbitration, while strictly legal considerations may
exclude, for example, recourse to the International Court of Justice. Cur-
rently, the simple existence of obligations owed at large may provide
sufficient justification, not just for "expressions of international con-
cern," 185 but also for formal protest on the part of UNHCR. 186 The signifi-
cance of this development for the individual's standing in general
international law should not be underestimated.
ANNEX
Conclusions on International Protection
Adopted by the Executive Committee
at its 28th Session*
The Committee
(1) General
(a) Was gravely preoccupied that in a number of cases the basic
human rights of refugees had still not been respected, that
refugees had been subjected to physical violence, to unjustified
and unduly prolonged measures of detention and to measures
of forcible return in disregard of the principle of non-refoulemen;
(b) Welcomed the efforts undertaken by the High Commissioner
in the field of international protection and recognized the ur-
gent need for these efforts to be continued and intensified,
Extract from the Report of the 28th Session of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme (1977): U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add. 1, at 12-16.
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particularly in those areas where the basic rights of refugees are
endangered;
(c) Reiterated its satisfaction at the establishment of the Sub-
Committee of the Whole on International Protection as a forum
for examining current problems and recommending appropri-
ate solutions in this field;
(d) Decided that the Sub-Committee of the Whole on Internation-
al Protection should meet for one full day immediately preced-
ing the opening of the twenty-ninth session of the Executive
Committee.
(2) International instruments
(a) Noted with disappointment that since the Committee's
twenty-seventh session only one further State had acceded to
the 1951 Convention and to the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees;
(b) Noted further that a large number of States had still not
become parties to these instruments and recommended that the
High Commissioner undertake a concerted and determined
initiative at the highest level to promote further accessions;
(c) Considered that such an initiative should also extend to pro-
moting the withdrawal of the geographical limitation still
maintained by certain States in respect of their obligations
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol;
(d) Reaffirmed the fundamental importance of the Statute of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
as a basis for the international protection function of the High
Commissioner, particularly in respect of States which had not
yet acceded to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol or
whose obligations under these instruments were restricted by
the geographical limitation.
(3) Asylum
(a) Noted with satisfaction the report of the High Commissioner
that States have generally continued to follow liberal asylum
practices;
(b) Concerned, however, that according to the report of the High
Commissioner cases continue to occur in which asylum-seekers
have encountered serious difficulties in finding a country will-
ing to grant them even temporary refuge and that refusal of
permanent or temporary asylum has led in a number of cases
to serious consequences for the persons concerned;
(c) Requested the High Commissioner to draw the attention of
Governments to the various international instruments existing
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in the field of asylum and reiterated the fundamental impor-
tance of these instruments from a humanitarian standpoint;
(d) Appealed to Governments to follow, or continue to follow,
liberal practices in granting permanent or at least temporary
asylum to refugees who have come directly to their territory;
(e) Called upon Governments to co-operate, in a spirit of interna-
tional solidarity, with the High Commissioner in the perform-
ance of his functions-especially with respect to asylum-in
accordance with General Assembly resolution 428 (V) of 14
December 1950.
(4) Non-refoulement
(a) Recalling that the fundamental humanitarian principle of non-
refoulement has found expression in various international instru-
ments adopted at the universal and regional levels and is gener-
ally accepted by States;
(b) Expressed deep concern at the information given by the High
Commissioner that, while the principle of non-re/oulement is in
practice widely observed, this principle has in certain cases
been disregarded;
(c) Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the observance of the
principle of non-refoulement-both at the border and within the
territory of a State-of persons who may be subjected to perse-
cution if returned to their country of origin irrespective of
whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees.
(5) Expulsion
(a) Recognized that, according to the 1951 Convention, refugees
lawfully in the territory of a Contracting State are generally
protected against expulsion and that in accordance with article
32 of the Convention expulsion of a refugee is only permitted
in exceptional circumstances;
(b) Recognized that a measure of expulsion may have very serious
consequences for a refugee and his immediate family members
residing with him;
(c) Recommended that, in line with article 32 of the 1951 Conven-
tion, expulsion measures against a refugee should only be
taken in very exceptional cases and after due consideration of
all the circumstances, including the possibility for the refugee
to be admitted to a country other than his country of origin;
(d) Recommended that, in cases where the implementation of an
expulsion measure is impracticable, States should consider giv-
ing refugee delinquents the same treatment as national delin-
quents and that States examine possibility of elaborating an
international instrument giving effect to this principle;
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(e) Recommended that an expulsion order should only be com-
bined with custody or detention if absolutely necessary for
reasons of national security or public order and that such custo-
dy or detention should not be unduly prolonged.
(6) Determination of refugee status
(a) Noted the report of the High Commissioner concerning the
importance of procedures for determining refugee status;
(b) Noted that only a limited number of States parties to the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol had established procedures
for the formal determination of refugee status under these
instruments;
(c) Noted, however, with satisfaction that the establishment of
such procedures was under active consideration by a number
of Governments;
(d) Expressed the hope that all States parties to the 1951 Conven-
tion and the 1967 Protocol which had not yet done so would
take steps to establish such procedures in the near future and
give favourable consideration to UNHCR participation in such
procedures in appropriate form;
(e) Recommended that procedures for the determination of ref-
ugee status should satisfy the following basic requirements:
(i) The competent official (e.g., immigration officer or border
police officer) to whom the applicant addresses himself at the
border or in the territory of a contracting State should have
clear instructions for dealing with cases which might come
within the purview of the relevant international instruments.
He should be required to act in accordance with the principle
of non-refoulement and to refer such cases to a higher authority.
(ii) The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to
the procedure to be followed.
(iii) There should be a clearly identified authority-wherever
possible a single central authority-with responsibility for ex-
amining requests for refugee status and taking a decision in the
first instance.
(iv) The applicant should be given the necessary facilities, in-
cluding the services of a competent interpreter, for submitting
his case to the authorities concerned. Applicants should also be
given the opportunity, of which they should be duly informed,
to contact a representative of UNHCR.
(v) If the applicant is recognized as a refugee, he should be
informed accordingly and issued with documentation certify-
ing his refugee status.
(vi) If the applicant is not recognized, he should be given a
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reasonable time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the
decision, either to the same or to a different authority, whether
administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system.
(vii) The applicant should be permitted to remain in the coun-
try pending a decision on his initial request by the competent
authority referred to in paragraph (iii) above, unless it has been
established by that authority that his request is clearly abusive.
He should also be permitted to remain in the country while an
appeal to a higher administrative authority or to the courts is
pending;
(f) Requested UNHCR to prepare, after due consideration of the
opinions of States parties to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol, a detailed study on the question of the extra-territori-
al effect of determination of refugee status in order to enable
the Committee to take a considered view on the matter at a
subsequent session taking into account the opinion expressed
by representatives that the acceptance by a Contracting State
of refugee status as determined by other States parties to these
instruments would be generally desirable;
(g) Requested the Office to consider the possibility of issuing-for
the guidance of Governments-a handbook relating to proce-
dures and criteria for determining refugee status and circulating
-with due regard to the confidential nature of individual re-
quests and the particular situations involved-significant deci-
sions on the determination of refugee status.
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Supp. (No. 17) 28, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962) (all relating to special help for Algerians fleeing
to Tunisia and Morocco to escape the effects of the struggle for liberation); see also G.A. Res.
1671, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 27, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962) (relating to Angolan
refugees in the Congo).
25 The term is employed but not defined in G.A. Res. 1499, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
26 Compare G.A. Res. 1167, 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 20, U.N. Doc. A/38C5 (1957)
with G.A. Res. 1784, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 34, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
27 Schnyder, supra note 11, at 426-33; Khan, supra note 11, at 306, 339-43.
28 Id.
29 G.A. Res. 3455, 30 U.N.GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 93, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
30 In 1977, the High Commissioner sought advice from the Executive Committee on the
refugee/displaced person distinction, but no formal response was forthcoming. For views
expressed, see Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (28th session),
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/549, paras. 21-26 (1977) (discussion of the applicability of the term
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(discussion of distinction between terms "refugee" and "displaced person"). See also the High
Commissioner's statement to the 31st Session of the Executive Committee, Executive Com-
mittee of the High Commissioner's Programme (31st session), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/588,
Annex 1 (1980) (discussing the High Commissioner's role with regard to "displaced persons"),
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Commissioner's mandate. In Mr. Inan's view, "the time had come to ensure that UNHCR did
not, by virtue of precedents, become a body which cared for anyone compelled for whatever
reason to leave his country or even to move to a different area inside his country." Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (31st session), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/
SR.319, paras. 12-15.
31 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3143, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 84, U.N. Doc. A/90/30 (1973)
(requesting the High Commissioner "to continue his assistance and protection actiyities in
favour of refugees within his mandate as well as for those to whom he extends his good offices
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G.A. Res. 32/68, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 140, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977) (continuing
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international protection ... to refugees and displaced persons .. ").
32 In considering, at large, the mandate of the Office of UNHCR, attention should also
be given to its increasing involvement in programs for the reception and rehabilitation of
returning refugees. The facilitation of voluntary repatriation is a prescribed function of the
Office (paragraphs 1 and 8(c) of the Statute). That this function should extend to a period
after initial return, when technically the persons in question will have ceased to be refugees,
was recognized by the General Assembly as early as 1961. G.A. Res. 1672, 16 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 17) 28, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962) (assistance to those repatriating to Algeria). Such
involvement has been maintained and expanded. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2789, 26 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 29) 84, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971) (recognizing the role the Office plays in facilitat-
ing the rehabilitation of groups of refugees who have voluntarily returned to their country
of origin); G.A. Res. 2958, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 65, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973)
(assistance to Sudanese refugees returning from abroad); G.A. Res. 33/26, 33 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 45) 139, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978) (commending the Office's efforts for assisting
in rehabilitation of returnees).
33 For example, would such lack of protection include the failure (or inability?) of a state
to safeguard or implement the rights set forth in the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966)? If not, why not? Is there a collection of basic rights, infringement of which would
indicate sufficient lack of protection? If so, what are they?
34 UNHCR Statute, supra note 8, para. 8(a).
35 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. 35.
36 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. I(A)(2). The statutory definition is discussed in
the text at notes 18-19 supra.
37 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. I(B).
38 "Social factors" also occur in other international instruments, for example, as a poten-
tial basis of (prohibited) discrimination. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.
2, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 2, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
39 In the treaties and agreements of the interwar years, a group approach was adopted.
Refugees were defined by reference to their country of origin and to their lack of protection
from their government; see, e.g., Arrangement relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to
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Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 63; Provisional Arrangement
concerning the Status of Refugees coming From Germany, July 4th 1936, 171 L.N.T.S. 76;
Additional Protocol to the Provisional Arrangement and to the Convention, signed at Geneva
on July 4, 1936, and Feb. 10, 1938, respectively, concerning the Status of Refugees Coming
From Germany, opened for signature, Sept. 14, 1939, 198 L.N.T.S. 141.
40 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, at 217.
41 Id. at 219-20.
42 Grahl-Madsen, however, considers that the notion was introduced to stop a potential
gap and concludes: "whenever a person is likely to suffer persecution merely because of his
background, he should get the benefit of the present provision." Id. at 220.
43 Recommendation E of the Final Act of the 1951 United Nations Conference on the
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Appendix of the 1951 Convention, supra note 15.
44 See, e.g., Molefi v. Principal Legal Adviser, [1971] A.C. 182, 186 (P.C.).
45 Such indeed has been held to be the case by one court in the Federal Republic of
Germany. See Judgment No. 74 of Nov. 25, 1958, Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwGE], 7
Entscheidungen des BVerwGE 333, 334.
46 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. 35.
47 The criterion for refugee status looks to the future; standards of proof which seek to
relate past causes to past effects (such as the balance of probabilities rule or the concept of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt) are manifestly inapplicable. Fernandez v. Government of
Singapore [1971] 1 W.L.R. 987, 993-94.
48 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. 32(3). See also Expulsion of an Alien (Austria) Case, 28
I.L.R. 310 (Supreme Court, Austria, 1958); 4 A. Kiss, REPERTOIRE FRANSAISE DE DROIT INTERNATION-
AL PUBLIC 462 (1962).
49 See also G. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT Or PERSONS BETWEEN
STATES 139-40 (1978).
50 Recommendation D of the Final Act of the 1951 United Nations Conference on the
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Appendix of the 1951 Convention, supra note 15.
51 28 I.L.R. 297 (Federal Administrative Court, Federal Republic of Germany, 1959).
52 5o5 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974).
53 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. 33(2) (emphasis added).
54 See GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 49.
55 OAU Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(2).
56 Id., art. 11(3).
57 Id., art. 11(4). Provision is made for "temporary residence" pending resettlement, but
its grant is not mandatory.
58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (commonly referred to as the European Convention on Human
Rights).
59 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 49, at 218-28; Nance, The Individual Right of Asylum Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, this volume, and the cases discussed therein.
60 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22(7), (8), OAS Official
Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1 1. Cf Young-Anawaty, Haitian Refugees v. United States: Bringing a
Country of Refuge Before the International Bench, this volume.
61 States' use of substitute terminology has not inhibited UNHCR from intervening to
protect groups and individuals from expulsion or return to a place of persecution or where
their life or freedom would otherwise be endangered.
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63 See 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-103 (1972);
Weis, LegalAspecs of the Con vention of 28 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 478, 481-83 (1953); Weis, Territorial Asylum, 6 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 173, 181-91 (1966); Weis,
The United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 7 CAN. Y.B. ITrr'L L. 92, 102-03 (1969).
64 In principle there is no reason why the rule of nonrefoulement should not also apply in
the context of extradition proceedings; the 1951 Convention already recognizes the interests
of the state of refuge in not committing itself to the reception of serious criminals (Articles
1(F)(b), 32(1) and 33(2) of the 1951 Convention, supra note 15), and the only issue of principle
is that of a potential conflict of treaty obligations. Extradition of refugees was considered at
the 31st Session of the Executive Committee. See Report of the Sub-Committee of the Whole
on International Protection, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme
(31st session), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/586, paras. 4-16, (1980); Report of the Executive Commit-
tee, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (31st session), U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/588, para. 48(2) (1980).
65 See Weis, Legal Aspects of the Convention of 28 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 63, at 482.
66 See, e.g., the phenomenon of "conventions de prise en charge de personnes a la fron-
tire," 1 H. BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVi 198 (5th ed. 1970); and the
phenomenon of "Ubernahme-" or "Schubabkommen," R. SCHIEDERMAIR, HANDBUCH DES Aus-
LXNDERRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 178, 227-30 (1968).
67 Convention on the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199.
This convention was ratified by only eight states. The United Kingdom, which did not ratify,
expressly objected to the principle of nonrejection at the frontier. Jennings, Some International
LawAspects of the Refugee Question, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 98, 105 (1939). In assessing this restrictive
view, note the essentially negative debate which surrounded proposals for a right to asylum
to be incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See the original draft of
Article 14 in 3 U.N. GAOR, Third Committee (121st meeting) 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/S.R.121
(1948); the objections raised by the Australian and Russian delegates, 3 U.N. GAOR, Third
Committee (122nd meeting) 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/S.R.122 (1948). See also H. LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHrs 421-23 (1950); 0. KIMMINICH, DER INTERNATIONALE
RECHTSSTATUS DES FCLCHrLINGs 76-88 (1962).
68 For example, in 1939, France received 400,000 refugees from Spain in just ten days. See
4 A. Kiss, supra note 48, at 433-35. In the six years of its operation, the IRO assisted in the
resettlement of integration of some 1,620,000 refugees.
69 See, e.g., N. BETHELL, THE LAST SECRET (1974); N. ToLSToY, VICTIMS OF YALTA (1977).
70 See, e.g., Schnyder, supra note 11, at 381. But cf Khan, supra note 11, at 318-22 (taking
the position that the lack of acceptance of a viable standard of nonrefoulementremains a "serious
gap" in refugee law).
71 See Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, art. 3,
159 L.N.T.S. 199; Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, Feb.
10, 1938, art. 5(2), 192 L.N.T.S. 59; 1951 Convention, supra note 15, art. 33(2); Declaration on
Territorial Asylum, art. 3(3), G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 81, U.N. Doc.
A/6716 (1978). Article 3(3) of the Declaration of Territorial Asylum declares that if a state
decides to make an exception to the principle of nonrefoulement, "it shall consider the possibility
of granting to the person concerned, under such conditions as it may deem appropriate, an
opportunity, whether by way of provisional asylum or otherwise, of going to another State."
7 2 The mass efflux/influx phenomenon raises its own very special problems, including the
question of causes, and has recently (November/December 1980) been under examination in
a number of international fora.
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wide and susceptible of different connotations in civil and common law countries. For an
examination of the ordre public concept, see GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 49.
74 Weis, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92, 147-49 (1969); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
66, 165-76 (1974).
75 See Report of the Secretary General: 1979 Geneva Meeting on Refugees and Displaced
Persons in South-East Asia, U.N. Doc. A/34/627, para. 48; id., Annex I, para. 8. The interna-
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76 See OAU Convention, supra note 16, art. II (prohibiting measures which would compel
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77 SeeAnnex to this article; see alsoReport of the Executive Committee, Executive Commit-
tee of the High Commissioner's Programme (30th session), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/572, para.
72, (1979).
78 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 32/67, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 139, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1977); G.A. Res. 33/26, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 139, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); G.A.
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Persons in Asia, reported in U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/INF.162 (1980).
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in GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 49, at 141.
81 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 42.
82 Cf Report on the Thirtieth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commis-
sioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/572, para. 72. On the "no derogation" issue, human
rights standards and general international law, see GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 49, at 58-74.
83 E.g., G.A. Res. 34/60, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 173, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
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GENEVA/LIB.SER.B/Ref.9, at 68-74 (1977).
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CONF.78/C.1/L.105 and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.78/12, Annex I, at 66 (1977).
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drafting committee omitted any mention of extradition, id. at 50-51, but the Committee of
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unable to complete its work and whether it will be reconvened is uncertain.
90 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, art. 1(3). An article on the right of
qualification was also proposed for inclusion in the Convention on Territorial Asylum. 32
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.78/12, Annex I, at 60 (1977).
91 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 62, at 46; INT'L L. Assoc., REPORT OF THE 53RD CONFERENCE
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92 GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 62, at 46, 88. See, in particular, Epps, supra note 87, and also
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International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, May 28-30, 1980).
95 This was first raised in 1979. On that occasion, the Executive Committee stated its view
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the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/572, para. 72 (1979). The tempo-
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Executive Committee's Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection; further
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Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/586, paras. 30-37
(1980).
96 See OAU Convention, supra note 16, art. 11(4), (5); Declaration on Territorial Asylum,
supra note 71, art. 3(3).
97 See Report of the 1979 Arusha Conference, Recommendations on the term "refugee"
and determination of refugee status, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme (30th session), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/INF.158, at 9 (1977).
9 8 SeeNote on the Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status Under International
Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/INF.152/Rev.2 (1980) (describing the procedures in 32
countries).
99 Migration Act 1958-1973, 7 Acts Ausm. P. 773 (1973). In 1980, the Immigration
(Unauthorized Arrivals) Act was enacted. One of its objectives is to prevent and punish the
act of carrying to Australia large numbers of asylum seekers in freighters fitted out for that
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100 This was confirmed by Cabinet decisions of May 24, 1977, and March 16, 1978.
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102 See note 100 supra.
103 [19751 Austl. Acts 869.
104 The right of appeal is made available, under part 22 of the schedule to the Administra-
tive Appeals Tribunal Act, to persons subject to deportation orders under sections 12 and 13
of the Migration Act 1958-1973.
105 The possibility of widening the scope of appeals in immigration matters is currently
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106 Ceskovic v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, March 27, 1979, aff'd 27
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108 Law of June 26, 1953, adopting the 1951 Refugee Convention, Moniteur, Oct. 4, 1953,
[1953] Pasinomie 723; ministerial decree of February 22, 1954, Moniteur, April 18, 1954; royal
decree of June 18, 1964, Monieur, June 30, 1964, [1964] Pasinomie 777, amending the royal decree
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110 Ministerial decree of Feb. 22, 1954, Moniteur, April 18, 1954.
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OFPRA, May 2, 1953 [1953] J.0. 4029, [1953] D.L. 158; Law no. 70-1076 authorizing acces-
sion to the 1967 Protocol, Nov. 25,1970, [1970] J.O. 10851, [1970] Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation 308.
113 Law no. 52-893, [1952] J.O. 7642, art. 2; Decree no. 53-377, [1953] J.O. 4029, arts. 1-2.
114 Law no. 52-893, [1952] J.O. 7642, art. 3; Decree no. 53-377, [1953] J.O. 4029, arts. 9-14.
115 Law no. 52-893, [1952] J.O. 7642, art. 2.
116 Id., art. 5; Decree no. 53-377, [1953] J.O. 4029, art. 15.
117 Law no. 52-893, [1952] J.0. 7642, art. 5(b).
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119 Id.
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121 Law no. 52-893, [1952] J.0. 7642, art. 5.
122 Decree no. 53-377, [1953] J.O. 4029, arts. 15-29.
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dElat, appointed by the president of the Commission des Recours to study the case and present
it to the Commission, either with or without recommendation.
126 Id., art. 25
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